Ukrainian Membership in NATO – Main Challenge to Russia at XXI century
Mikhail Barabanov, Editor-in-chief Moscow Defense Brief
After the reassuring visit of Bush to Kiev, the members of the Ukrainian “Orange” elite expect that Ukraine will be accepted into NATO, independently of the result of the NATO summit meeting in Bucharest.
The issue about the possible entrance of Ukraine into NATO is the most serious challenge for Russia foreign policy—both in relations with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and in relations with non-CIS countries. Moreover, to a significant degree, this issue should be considered as a moment of truth for Moscow, since, mostly likely, it will compel both the Russian political leadership and Russian society take a position on the fundamental principles of the policy of Russia toward the government of Ukraine and NATO.
Why is Ukraine aspiring to join NATO?
It is quite clear that a decisive factor motivating that part of the Ukrainian political elite that is promoting the entrance of the country into NATO is its very deep-seated hostility toward Russia. Russia is perceived as a historical enemy and the main goal of Ukrainian foreign policy is the maximal distancing of Ukraine from Russia in all aspects.
The militant Russophobes, who are presently in power in Kiev, are manifesting themselves in literally all aspects of domestic policy and foreign policy of the Ukrainian state, as well as all domestic policy debates and foreign policy debates in Ukraine.
In confidential documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, which leaked out in the press, it is directly stated “the entrance [of Ukraine] into NATO will mean the final escape of Ukraine from being under the influence of Russia and the liquidation of the possibility of [ever coming under] that influence again in the future.” Thus, NATO is perceived [by the Ukrainian leadership] as an instrument for the protection of Ukraine from Russia and it is the anti-Russian policy of NATO that is the main and most important characteristic of that organization in the eyes of the pro-Western Ukrainian leaders. If NATO were not an anti-Russian alliance, the question of the entrance into NATO would never have been raised at all in Kiev.
All of that clearly demonstrates that present-day Kiev, regardless of the public assurances of friendship and partnership [of Ukraine toward Russia], really perceives Moscow as “enemy number one” and the main threat to Ukraine. That is why Ukraine is supporting any anti-Russian forces and actions in the post-Soviet zone—from providing support and arms for the regime of Saakashvili to the establishment, upon the initiative of Kiev, of the notorious GUAM alliance. And the intention of Kiev to bring Ukraine into NATO finally rips away the cover of the ambiguity from Russian-Ukrainian relations. Ukrainian plans for entrance into NATO are nothing more than a completely open demonstration of an anti-Russian policy on the part of the political leadership of Ukraine.
The Bryansk-Belgorod-Krasnodar front line.
The question naturally arises: If the present-day political leadership of Ukraine conducts such an openly anti-Russian policy, isn’t it time for Moscow to face reality and begin to construct its own policy toward this formerly fraternal republic, a policy that is adequate?
In the first place, it is necessary clearly to recognize that the possible entrance of Ukraine into NATO will mean the most fundamental and direct threat to the security Russian Federation as a state, as well as a most serious threat to the Russian people as a nation. It is a threat that exceeds, with respect to scale, all of the other challenges to Russia from the time of the disintegration of the USSR, including the threat of Chechen terrorism.
On the level of geopolitics and civilization, the entrance of Ukraine into NATO will mean the transformation of the Russian-Ukrainian border into a line of confrontation between the West and the East and a final separation of a single Russian people (the Russian people include both Great Russians and Ukrainians). That will lead to the cutting off of billions of human and social contacts between people living in the Russian Federation and people living in Ukraine; the acceleration of the formation of a separate “Ukrainian people”, cultural guidelines which will be built on the repulsion of everything Russian, and the consolidation of the Ukrainian state on a completely anti-Russian basis. Inevitable concomitants of these processes will be the attempts at the complete suppression of Russian identity of all of the entire Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, the “Ukrainification” of all of the non-Ukrainian territories, and the liquidation of any Russian influence in territories which were historically populated with Russian-speaking people—in the eastern part of Ukraine, in Novorossiya, and in the Crimean.
In the political respect, the membership of Ukraine in NATO will be the final consolidation of the disintegration of the USSR and it will signify the readiness of the West to proceed to the encirclement and political isolation of Russia. Ukraine will be transformed into the cornerstone of the new anti-Russian “sanitary cordon” and it will become a bridgehead for the further strengthening of the pressure of the West on Russia.
Of course, the final goal of the West will be the complete liquidation of Russia as a great power, the weakening and disintegration of it, and the “throwing of the Russian barbarians back into the wild eastern steppes”. There is no doubt that those goals are fully supported by the nationalistic component of the present-day Ukrainian elite, which sees the complete neutralization of Russia as the guarantee of Ukrainian independence.
In the military-strategic respect, the expansion of NATO to the territory of Ukraine will be a catastrophe for the military security of the Russian Federation. The military potential of NATO, which is the most powerful military alliance in history, will approach right up to the extensive borders of the most developed and densely populated regions of the European part of Russia. The strategic forward defensive position will be thrown back to what it was 500 years ago. Moscow will actually end up as a border city and a city near the front. It will be within the range of tactical aviation or operational-tactical missiles deployed in Ukraine. Russia will be confronted with the threat of the rise of an extensive, continuous ground front.
However, Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, is demagogically making statements about the readiness to make it obligatory obligation that there be “no deployment of foreign military bases on the territory of Ukraine” (incidentally, “foreign” here obviously extends to the basing of the Black Sea Fleet [on Ukrainian territory] in Sevastopol). Such an “obligation”, in actual fact, will have no serious meaning, since the mobility of the modern armed forces of the United States and NATO will make it possible for them, in case of necessity, to carry out a rapid deployment [of troops] on the territory of Ukraine.
On the political level, however, it is quite clear that this “obligation”, with the threat of a reference to it, will be used by Kiev as an instrument of blackmail if any complications spring up in bilateral relations [between Ukraine and Russia].
Consequently, it would be completely stupid on the part of Moscow give in to the promise of some kind of ephemeral obligations and compensation on the part of unstable and irresponsible political leaders in Kiev concerning an issue that so vitally important for the Russian people.
NATO and Russia.
It is also necessary to take a clear, unambiguous look at the role of NATO. NATO was created as a military coalition, exclusively directed against the USSR (Russia). At the present time, NATO, regardless of all of the geopolitical shifts in Europe and the world, remains an anti-Russian alliance. The entire sense of meaning of the alliance consists of that. If Russia did not exist, there would be no NATO. As a matter of fact, as it was already mentioned, it is the anti-Russian orientation of NATO that is both the main attracting feature of that organization for Kiev and the main motivating factor [for the Ukrainian political leadership in its campaign] for the entrance of Ukraine into that alliance. If NATO were not an anti-Russian bloc, the “Ukrainian patriots”.
The task of the alliance “to keep the Russians out of Europe”, which was formulated by Lord Ismay, the first secretary general of NATO, in 1956, continues to be the main strategic policy of the NATO countries toward Russia. Only now it is being proposed to advance the border of Europe up near Smolensk and Kursk. In essence, the West, at the present time, by bringing Ukraine into NATO, is trying to reproduce, in the post-Soviet zone, the previous split in Central Europe, such as the previous division of Germany and turn the line of this split into a border between two worlds, a line of permanent tension and potential military confrontation. That hardly will suit anybody in Russia.
On account of the partnership, it is time for Russia, without any quibbling, to make a clear and direct statement about the anti-Russian orientation of NATO and make it clear that the further expansion of NATO presents a direct threat to our national security and that any republic of the former USSR that declares its intention to join NATO thereby automatically declares its hostility toward Russia. And it is time unambiguously and clearly to declare this position to the ruling elite and population of Ukraine.
The present ambiguous position of Russia toward the intentions of the political leadership in Kiev to bring about the entrance of Ukraine into NATO is disorienting both for Russian and Ukrainian policy. On the one hand, Moscow is letting it be known that it is opposed to the entrance of Ukraine into NATO. On the other hand, Moscow is making official statements that seem to imply that it is not opposed to the entrance of Ukraine into NATO and that the matter should be left to “the will of the Ukrainian people (an amusing appeal to democratic principles on the part of the Kremlin, which hardly demonstrates that much respect for such principles at home]. Finally, at the same time, Russia itself is continuing its strange, comic partnership with NATO, thereby providing the pro-NATO groups in Ukraine to opportunity endlessly to refer to this circumstance as an example and a justification of their policy.
In essence, Russia is simply shamelessly avoiding the discussion of the most dangerous problem regarding its national security and it is avoiding the battle for public opinion on this issue in Ukraine. Thus, Moscow is paralyzing any actions and arguments of the opponents of NATO in Ukraine, as well as of those opponents in NATO and in the West as a whole, who fear the consequences of such an expansion of NATO for the security of Europe. Several years ago, the same ambiguous, taciturn, appeasing position of Moscow on the issue of the entrance of the Baltic republics into NATO paralyzed the opponents of that move in the Baltic region and in the West. Indeed, those critics “could not be more Russian than the Russians themselves”. Meanwhile, at that time, in the period 2003-2004, it was already quite clear that, after the entrance of the Baltic states into NATO, the question about the entrance of Ukraine into NATO would inevitably arise.
What is Russia to do?
It is time for responsible forces in Russia finally to understand that a situation is forming up in which, in the most direct sense, the “enemy is at the gate”.
Geopolitically, Russia already has no place to which it can retreat. Moscow is behind. Moscow itself—and that is not an idiom. The threat of the entrance of Ukraine into NATO in the foreseeable future is the main direct, external challenge to the security of Russia and the Russian people. Correspondingly, it is necessary to concentrate all of the possible efforts on the prevention of that threat.
It is necessary for Moscow finally to begin a decisive battle for Ukraine. For that purpose, it is necessary maximally to stress the problem about NATO in bilateral relations and, simultaneously, make every effort to facilitate the aggravation of the domestic political battle in Ukraine. For that purpose, it is necessary firmly and clearly to let it be understood by everybody in Ukraine that, for Russia, the issue here concerns the most principal matters, about which there can be no compromises whatsoever. We cannot be satisfied with any decision except the full rejection, by Ukraine, of entrance into NATO at any time. Russia must conduct a large-scale campaign to intimate the [pro-Western] political elite and the population of Ukraine. It is necessary, with maximal clarity, to let every inhabitant [of Ukraine] know that the entrance of Ukraine into NATO threatens [to bring about] the most unpredictable consequences both for the relations of Ukraine with Russia and for the security of Ukraine and its population. The motto of Moscow must be direct: The entrance of Ukraine into NATO will not increase the security of Ukraine. Rather, it will catastrophically reduce that security and place Ukraine under a critical threat.
And no NATO will save Ukraine. Moscow must very clearly let it be understood by the political leaders in Kiev that any person who advocates the entrance of Ukraine into NATO will be considered to be an enemy of Russia, with all of the consequences entailed by that.
At the same time, Russia must render comprehensive aid to all anti-NATO Ukrainian politicians and social forces, not sparing resources for that, including financial resources. It is necessary, in the strongest way possible, to work with Ukrainian society. It is time to stop fearing the cries about “the interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine (such cries, coming from the mouth of the “Orange” leaders, are particularly comical, since they received help from the West [in bringing about the “Orange” revolution]). For Ukraine, there are no “internal affairs” separate from Russia and there can be no “internal affairs” separate from Russia. We are fraternal nations and their [Ukrainian] internal affairs are also our affairs.
It is also necessary maximally and openly to call into question the correspondence of the actions of the Ukrainian political leaders, who are advocating the entrance of Ukraine into NATO, with the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, which was signed in 1997. Indeed, the meaning of this treaty is obvious to everybody: Russia recognized Ukraine as an independent, friendly state and recognized the border of Ukraine as its border in 1991 (that is to say, 1954) in exchange for the conducting, by Ukraine, of a friendly policy toward Russia and the taking into consideration, by Ukraine, of Russian interests in the sphere of security, as well as respect, on the part of Ukraine, for Russian interests in the Crimea. It is directly stated in the treaty “that the sides base their relations on principles of strategic partnership and are obligated to restrain from participation in or support for any actions of any kind whatsoever that can inflict damage on the security of the other country”.
In this connection, over the period of the last decade, official Kiev has repeatedly and systematically violated the spirit and letter of this treaty, especially regarding the situation in the Crimea. The Ukrainian political leaders are impudently trampling upon the interests of the Russian-speaking population of the Crimea. They are conducting a policy of Ukrainification. They are conducting irresponsible agitation of the Crimean Tatar extremists [who are hostile toward the Russian-speaking people who reside in the Crimea] and, on the whole, they are driving Russia out of the Crimea and creating intolerable conditions for the basing and development of the Black Sea Fleet. Crimean autonomy, in essence, has been trampled on by Kiev.
Up until now, Moscow, in a “politically correct manner”, has closed its eyes to all of that. However, in view of the campaign for the entrance of Ukraine into NATO, it is simply not acceptable for Moscow to hide its head in the sand like an ostrich. It is necessary loudly to proclaim the Russian rights in the Crimea. It is also necessary clearly to formulate a position on the impossibility of adhering to the terms of the [fore-mentioned] treaty of 1997 while Kiev is trying to bring Ukraine into NATO. Russia must be ready demonstratively to cancel its participation in that treaty. At the same time, Moscow must undertake resolute and large-scale actions for the support and organization of the Russian movement in the Crimea and Sevastopol. It must unambiguously orientate itself toward the possibility of taking measures to tear the Crimea away from Ukraine, in case Kiev continues its unfriendly policy.
It is difficult to understand why we must leave this valuable “gift of Khrushchev” [Note: Reference here is to the fact that Nikita Krushchev ceded the Crimean peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954.] to an openly hostile state, and especially to NATO. Especially when we now have the precedent of Kosovo in front of our eyes.
Also, Russia must extensively and openly support all of the Russian-speaking people and autonomous movements on the territory of the rest of Ukraine—primarily in the eastern part of Ukraine and in Novorossiya. Russia must reach out to all of its friends and supporters. The nationalists in Kiev must receive an unambiguous warning that Russia does not have the slightest motivation and obligation to support the territorial integrity of Ukraine as a candidate for membership in NATO or as a member of NATO. On the contrary: The worse it will be for NATO and the less the territory controlled by NATO, the better it will be for us. And Russia must put this policy into practice.
It is also necessary actively to work with constructive elements in the “old” members of NATO, demonstrating to them that the entrance of Ukraine into NATO, in conditions of hostility on the part of Russia to such a move, bears a threat to their security. In the final count, in this case, very few people are found in Europe who want to “die for Danzig” [Note: Reference here appears to be to the title of an article. “Why Die for Danzig?”. It was published in L’Oeuvre on 4 May 1939 . In the article, the author, Marcel Deat, a French philosopher and politician, argued that it was not worth dying trying to save Danzig [and the rest of Poland] from an attack by Nazi Germany. Deat favored the appeasement of Hitler and, after France was conquered by Germany, he agitated for collaboration between France and Germany.].
Finally, it is time, without false modesty, to speak about the possibility, for Russia, of strengthening its position regarding the ever increasing hostility of Kiev with more convincing arguments. The recent statement of [Vladimir Putin], President of Russia, on this issue appears to be quite pertinent. Russia should not hold back from expressing its readiness to use all of the means at its disposal for the prevention of the entrance of Ukraine into NATO, the protection of Russian interests in the Crimea and Sevastopol, and the support of the people of eastern Ukraine and Novorossiya, who are for friendly relations with Russia. It is necessary for Russia to strengthen the grouping of its ground troops on the border with Ukraine, bringing it up to the level of five “heavy” divisions of permanent readiness, at a minimum. That would give a clear signal to the pro-NATO politicians in Kiev. It would let them know that we are not joking with them and that Moscow is ready to go very far. The presence of an effective grouping of forces of permanent readiness on the border with Ukraine will make it possible to take into consideration any development of events and, acting jointly with the Airborne Troops, carry out effective intervention in the case of the deterioration of the situation involving the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine and in order to support Russian interests in the Crimea. If NATO wants to establish a “sanitary cordon” on the present-day Russian-Ukrainian border and if that “sanitary cordon” is inevitable as a result of the actions of the Russophobes in Kiev, it would be simply absurd for Russia to reject, beforehand, the possibility, under a favorable confluence of circumstances, of moving that “cordon” as far as possible back toward the West. We must base our actions exclusively on interests of national security and not on the false integrity of an artificial Ukrainian [political] formation, which is becoming more and more hostile [toward Russia]. Those who throw out a fundamental challenge to the vital interests of the Russian people must be prepared to pay for that [that is, those people must be ready to suffer the consequences].
Vyacheslav Boguslayev, Chairman of the Board of Directors of “Motor Sich”, an open joint-stock company in Zaporozhe [Motor Sich is Ukraine’s leading manufacturer of aviation engines], Deputy in the Verkhovna Rada [the parliament of Ukraine]:
Although the political leadership of Ukraine has repeatedly declared its intention of bringing Ukraine into NATO, the real consequences of that decision have still not been analyzed. In this debate, the emotions of the supporters and opponents of such a move are prevailing over rational arguments. Instead of objective, quantitative evaluations and analysis, “divination according to coffee grounds” is being carried out, with foggy reasoning concerning the flow of foreign investments [to Ukraine], financial aid, and other such “manna from heaven”. Meanwhile, the economic and social consequences of the entrance of Ukraine into NATO is fully subject to objective evaluation and analysis.
As the states of Eastern Europe that recently joined NATO learned through experience, most of the expenses for rearmament [REFERENCE here is to the NATO requirement that new members modernize their armed forces and bring them up to NATO standards] of their armed forces had to be paid from their own national budgets. As a result of the entrance of Ukraine, direct losses of the military-industrial complex and the budget of Ukraine would consist of 3-7 billion dollars per year, according to a preliminary estimate—due to the loss of orders from the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the curtailment of military-technical cooperation with Iran, and the partial curtailment of military-technical cooperation with China and Arab countries. These losses will only be offset to an insignificant degree by the meager technical aid provided to Ukraine by the countries of NATO. Moreover, due to the collapse of cooperative interactions between Russian and Ukrainian enterprises of the military-industrial complex, the Ukrainian defense industry will actually cease to exist and weaponry and military equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have to be imported.
Other direct economic losses will include: The loss of income for citizens who travel to Russia for work and the reduction of income for the health and recreation resorts of the Crimea and the coast of the Sea of Azov as a result of a reduction of the flow of tourists into those areas from the CIS. It is estimated that these losses will amount to about 2-5 billion dollars per year and they will affect citizens who, for the most part, will not be compensated by anybody.
Thus, as a result of the entrance of Ukraine into NATO, the overall, direct economic losses for Ukraine will amount to 5-12 billion dollars per year, depending on the intensity of the process for the joining [of NATO by Ukraine].
The indirect consequences of the entrance of Ukraine into NATO for the economy of Ukraine will be mainly due to a sharp deterioration the trade-economic regimen of cooperation with Russia and other states of the Eurasian Economic Union, which forms the Customs Union.
The entrance of Ukraine into NATO will make the formation of a unified economic zone with Russia and other countries of the CIS impossible. It will lead to a transition to world prices in the natural gas trade and other energy carriers exported from Russia [to Ukraine] and, consequently, it will also lead to a sharp reduction of the profitability and competitiveness of Ukrainian metallurgical, chemical. machine-building, and food enterprises. According to current estimates, the majority of them will become bankrupt and more than a million workers will lose their jobs. Many regions of Ukraine will end up in a deep depression.
In the middle term, the increase in prices for gas, which would bring the prices up to the level of [Western] Europe, will cause a sharp reduction of Ukrainian exports (by a factor of 1.5-2), with a simultaneous rise in prices for imports. The balance of payments of Ukraine will deteriorate. The deficit [in the balance of payments], after the transition to world prices for energy carriers [that is, prices for gas and oil] and the curtailment of free trade relations with Russia, may exceed 10 billion dollars.
The cessation of a significant part of the highly technological production will occur—as a result the breaking off of cooperative interactions [with Russia] in the aviation, missile and space, ship-building, instrument-manufacturing, and other branches of science-intensive industry. That will lead to a shut-down of the most prospective Ukrainian machine-building enterprises. Almost half of the cost of the finished products of those enterprises consists of Russian components and the main market for the sale of such products is in Russia. And that means that [Ukraine] would fall into full technological dependence on the West. There would be a transition to production using labor-intensive [Russian: otvertochnye] technologies and, as a result, the loss of engineering technology. That is, the loss of the ability to conduct research and develop, and manufacture industrial products.
As a result, the inevitable devaluation of the [Ukrainian] grivna (in the first stage, by 25-40 percent) will provide a powerful stimulus to inflation and the Ukrainian monetary authorities will only be able to stop [the inflation] through a sharp reduction in the standard of living. It will decline by no less than a factor of two, taking into consideration that, along with a rise in price of import goods by a factor of 1.5, the taxes on public utilities will rise even more. In this connection, the expected decrease in the GDP of Ukraine will consist of not less than 15 percent.
It should also be understood that the entrance of Ukraine into NATO will mean the actual renunciation, by Ukraine, of national sovereignty in the military-political sphere, and, in the future, in the economic sphere. As a result of the decision [to join NATO], Ukraine will lose most of its industry and it will also lose national control over its own economy. The banking sector and the large industrial enterprises will be put under the control of foreign owners.
The balance of minuses and pluses for the entrance of Ukraine into NATO is so obvious that such thoughtless conduct on the part of the Ukrainian leadership evokes perplexity. The entrance of Ukraine and Russia into a unified economic zone is the only reliable long-term basis for the prevention of a crisis and for successful economic development. This unified economic zone would provide for the formation of a common customs union. Legal documents have already been prepared. Only the political will for the Ukrainian leadership is necessary.
